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Abstract

This paper investigates the association between
board busyness (i.e., directors with multiple positions)
and the occurrence of reported information security
incidents. Building on prior studies of board busyness,
this paper argues that directors holding multiple
board seats may fail to commit the time and effort
necessary to ensure the appropriate information
security strategy or investment plans are in place. Our
results demonstrate that board busyness is positively
associated with reported information security
incidents. This effect is larger when independent
directors are busy, thus suggesting the importance of
the governance role played by independent directors
in managing information security risks. The board of
directors’ role has been emphasized in anecdotal
evidence and IT governance frameworks, but our
study empirically demonstrates the board’s relevance
in information security strategy and management.

1. Introduction
In the information security literature, the
imperative role of top management to support the
adoption and implementation of information security
management has received well-acknowledged support
[19, 21]. Nonetheless, with the increasing headlines
reporting on data breaches and cyberattacks, there is a
call that board-level information security governance
assess information technology (IT)-related risks that
can potentially have a catastrophic impact on
organizational performance and operations [26, 33].
Anecdotal evidence from, for example, Deloitte, Ernst
& Young (EY), and the International Association of
Privacy Professionals (IAPP) highlights the board of
directors’ importance regarding information security
strategy and the potential damage to organizational
performance in the event the board fails to perform its
job of risk oversight. Additionally, in late 2013, the
US retailer Target experienced one of the largest data
breaches in the industry, resulting in the resignation of
the company’s chief executive officer (CEO) and a
call from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) to
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oust several of Target’s directors on the board for their
failure to ensure the appropriate management of
information security risks. These developments are
consistent with the message from the IT Governance
Institute [23] claiming that boards of directors now
bear a greater responsibility in ensuring the protection
of information assets in organizations and establishing
an appropriate governance strategy to meet the
strategic business objectives and comply with
regulatory compliance requirements.
Given the importance of board-level governance
for IT issues, emerging scholarly research develops a
conceptual framework for board members’ role in IT
governance [8, 37] or empirically investigates the
effect of board-level IT governance on both directors’
perceived organizational, financial performance [44]
and reported security breaches [20]. Turel and Bart
[44] note that the board of directors is responsible for
overseeing the management of an organization by
“asking management questions about existing and
potential IT risks” and “making sure risks are
identified and monitored” (p.225). This perspective
highlights the board of directors’ important
organizational capability of endorsing security policy
and ensuring the appropriate countermeasures are
established against security risks.
In this research, we claim that the board plays a
crucial role in influencing how senior managers plan
risk mitigation strategies and develop proactive
cybersecurity practices. To further understand the
board’s role in security governance, for the following
reasons, this study extends the focus from the board
structure to the concept of board busyness, which
commonly refers to the number of multiple board
appointments a director holds that consequently
renders him/her too busy to adequately perform the
monitoring function. Our perspective on busyness is
rooted in the argument that limited attention
capabilities and time constraints prevent a busy
director from effectively performing the monitoring
function. Although Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard
[15] find no evidence of a negative association
between multiple board appointments and corporate
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performance, Fich and Shivdasani [16] question the
methodological design in Ferris, Jagannathan, and
Pritchard [15], and their reexamination of empirical
data indicates that multiple directorships are
associated with weaker corporate governance. Fich
and Shivdasani [16] finding is consistent with the
policy recommendation from the National Association
of Corporate Directors [43] that called for limits on the
number of board seats held by directors. Jiraporn et al.
[25] also find that busy directors have a higher
tendency to be absent from board meetings. Thus,
from the viewpoint of time allocation and monitoring,
we argue that busy directors holding multiple board
seats may fail to provide the time commitment
required to participate in the company’s overall
security strategy and governance.
Second, Curry [8] posits that, in contrast with
their understanding of other forms of risks, most board
members do not possess expertise in cybersecurity
risks; to overcome this obstacle, the recommendation
is that the board actively engage in conversations with
security leaders in the organization and include
information security discussions in its meeting agenda.
Additionally,
as
highlighted
in
a
PricewaterhouseCoopers report, “boards can keep up
to speed with effectiveness of the company’s security
program by meeting regularly with the company’s top
security owner, such as the Chief Information Officer
(CIO) or the Chief Information Security Officer
(CISO)” (2015, p.1). Again, these viewpoints imply
that effective information security governance
requires the board’s commitment and efforts to engage
in a management discussion, to understand the risk
profile specific to its organization, to set the direction
for risk management and security policy, and to
monitor the information security program’s
effectiveness. Overall, we believe that, in addition to
board composition, board busyness is another feature
that is highly relevant and worthy of investigating in
the security governance context.
Thus, our research objective is to empirically
investigate the link between board busyness and the
effectiveness of organizational information security.
Similar to prior studies, we used the information
security incidents report as an indicator for measuring
the effectiveness of information security management
[29]. Empirically, reported information security
incidents were manually collected from DataLossDB ,
while board busyness was calculated using the
eigenvector centrality measure in the network
analysis. We also perform additional analyses by
focusing on (1) the role of independent directors and
(2) the source of the information security incidents.
The paper is organized as follows: The next
section reviews the existing literature on information

security management and governance and the relevant
theoretical background on board busyness and
governance effectiveness. Section three presents our
econometric model and research methodology. Next,
we discuss the empirical results and conclude the
paper with the theoretical and practical implications of
this research.

2. Theoretical background and hypothesis
development
In the first part of this section, we review and
discuss the extant studies on information security
management and governance. In particular, we focus
on studies addressing the role of top management and
the board in the design and implementation of
information security programs. In part two, we discuss
the association between board busyness and
information security governance, followed by the
development of the main hypotheses for our empirical
analyses.

2.1. Information security management and
governance
Within the literature, the primary focus has been
placed on organizational end users and employees,
such as user awareness and motivation [9, 27],
information security policy compliance [5, 46, 49],
and risk management [42]. In recent years, attention
has also been shifted to the importance of top
management in directing and shaping the
implementation and consequences of information
security management. From our perspective, studies
such as [18, 21, 36] are significant because they
demonstrate the importance of top management’s
character in supporting the implementation of
information security programs in an organization and
shaping employees’ attitudes toward information
security compliance. Nonetheless, from the
information security governance perspective, the
board of directors is another key group of actors who
must understand the business risks and ensure they are
adequately addressed. Their importance has been
gradually reported and highlighted in a broader
concept of IT governance, of which information
security governance and risk management are an
integral part [32, 34]. Nolan and McFarlan [33] were
among the first to highlight the value of board
oversight of IT investment strategy and corporate
information asset risk management. Building on their
early work on the IT strategic grid, Nolan and
McFarlan [33] proposed that companies in different
modes of the strategic grid should implement diverse
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arrangements for board committees and their
corresponding
responsibilities.
For
example,
companies in factory strategic modes require that their
boards of directors conduct regular reviews of security
effectiveness and reliability to avoid possible business
interruptions and organizational crises. Nolan and
McFarlan [33] suggest that these companies’ boards
should question both the quality of business continuity
planning against attack and the quality of management
processes for ensuring a 24/7 service level. Andriole
[1] also conducted a descriptive survey with more than
fifty CIOs and found that CIO perception of board
oversight for IT investment and project management
is relatively low. Andriole [1] offers prescriptive
recommendations for actions to increase board
members’ level of engagement as well as the
alignment of business and IT strategy at the board
level. Turel and Bart [44] also determine that boardlevel involvement in IT governance can influence
organizational performance. They conclude that
board-level IT governance is an important
organizational capability for achieving strategic
advantages and managing IT-associated risks. A
similarly positive relationship between board IT
governance and firm performance was also reported in
studies by both Jewer and McKay [24]and Turel, Liu,
and Bart [45].
Emphasizing the concept of information security
governance, Johnston and Hale [26] illustrate the
discrepancy of information protection quality between
those companies that implemented information
security governance and those that did not. They found
that for those organizations with information security
governance in place, the reported executive
management’s support is much higher. Parent and
Reich [34] propose a framework of IT risk governance
chain and dashboard to help the board more effectively
govern IT-related risks such as infrastructure,
information, and business continuity risks. Hsu and
Wang [20] drew on the organizational demography
perspective and conducted an exploratory study on the
association between board structure and composition,
such as board size, the heterogeneity of directors’
ages/tenures, and the possibility of security breaches.
Hsu and Wang [20]indicate that security breaches are
less likely to occur when the board is larger and the
directors, on average, are older and possess longer
organizational tenures.
Overall, we find that the value and importance of
board oversight of IT investment and security
management have been widely recognized and
discussed in practitioner-oriented publications and
surveys [23, 41]. To address this gap, we next theorize
and empirically test board busyness and its impact on
information security breaches in organizations.

2.2. Board busyness and information security
management effectiveness
Studies on upper management examine a variety
of factors that might influence its effectiveness in
performing these functions (e.g., the board’s
composition). In our empirical research, we focus on
another important feature called board busyness. As
we briefly note in the introduction, multiple
directorships can pose implications for the allocation
of time and attention to effectively perform the
monitoring function. Harris and Shimizu [17] explain
that busy boards are “likely to threaten available
preparation time for board meetings…time constraints
may limit these directors’ ability to provide useful
advice” (p. 777). We find this argument particularly
salient in the information security governance context.
When compared with general financial and managerial
controls, this dimension of security knowledge is more
organization specific [48] and requires that the board
“be aware of the organization’s information assets and
their criticality to ongoing business operations” (p.21)
[23]. Rothrock, Kaplan, and Van der Oord [40]
propose that the board involvement in cybersecurity
discussion should not go beyond the yearly or
semiannual reporting meetings. Namely regarding
nontechnical board members that comprise the board’s
majority, spending more time interacting with
information security officers can greatly increase the
knowledge and awareness of possible IT-related risks
and breaches, which is consistent with Parent and
Reich’s [34] argument that the boards should devote
more time and effort to IT risk governance than they
have in the past.
Thus, increased board awareness implies greater
demand from the board’s time for gaining a clear and
full understanding of protecting corporate information
assets and asking relevant questions about technology
risks and current security practices. Further, increased
board awareness might lead to an increase in the
number or length of board meetings to allow for access
to organizational knowledge. Jiraporn et al. [25]
demonstrate that directors with more board seats have
a greater tendency to be absent from board meetings.
We believe such absences may pose implications for
accessing organization-specific information that might
be available during board meetings and may thus
weaken the soundness of information security
governance in a firm. Thus, we propose the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Board busyness is negatively
associated with the effectiveness of information
security management.
The corporate governance literature has also
emphasized the distinction between independent
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directors and insider directors. Scholars argue the
independent director’s role is particularly important
for enforcing the monitoring and oversight function of
organizational performance [11, 28, 38]. Independent
directors are more likely to have independent
perspectives because they are outside directors rather
than employees of or affiliated with the firm. Beasley
[2] found a negative relation between the incidence of
financial fraud and independent directors, while other
studies have provided empirical support for the
adverse impact on firm performance when
outside/independent directors hold multiple board
seats. For instance, Fich and Shivdasani [16]
discovered that, when a majority of outside directors
are busy holding three or more board seats, firms have
weaker corporate governance. Additionally, Falato,
Kadyrzhanova, and Lel [13] suggests that investors do
value independent directors’ efforts and time in
governance oversight and that independent directors’
busyness is negatively related to firm value. Similarly,
Liu, Wang, and Wu [30] found that independent
directors’ attendance at board meetings plays an
important role in investor protection.
In the information security context, we contend
that independent directors would be serving a more
important function than insider directors in terms of
monitoring the strategic position and implementing
the information security program within an
organization. Turel and Bart [44]also indicate that “the
board can raise IT questions…and ultimately prevent
opportunistic behaviors of management (e.g., ensure
that the executive management team invests in proper
IT security measures, rather than giving themselves a
bonus)” (p. 227). However, aligning with our earlier
argument on the time and attention required to gain
familiarity with the cybersecurity practices in an
organization, we argue that, when independent
directors serve on multiple boards, there exist greater
implications for the board’s decision quality in
providing direction and oversight for information
security programs compared to the board as a whole.
Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The negative association between
the busyness of independent directors and the
effectiveness of information security management is
greater than that for the board as a whole.

3. Data description and econometric
model
For our empirical analysis, we collected data
regarding reported information security breaches,
board busyness, and control variables. Please note that
we only consider information security incidents

reported by news articles, but not incidents detected by
companies.

3.1. Dependent variable
Our study operationalized the effectiveness of
information security management by using the
realization of information security risks (i.e., reported
information security incidents) because (1) the
effectiveness of information security management is
not observable by both insiders and outsiders [29] and
(2) this approach has been commonly used in
information security-related studies [29, 50] and
operational risk management studies [47]. We
collected reported information security breaches
(denoted as BREACH) that were reported as
information security incidents in news articles.
BREACH is a dummy variable that equals one when a
firm-year has reported information security breaches
and zero otherwise. Specifically, we manually
collected all reported information security incidents
from DataLossDB (http://datalossdb.org/) including
those from 2003 to 2013 in order to match what we
have access for the board data. DataLossDB is
operated by a nonprofit organization and states on its
website that it collects breach information daily from
news outlets including news feeds, blogs, and
websites. For our analyses, we excluded the
information security breaches of nonprofit
organizations, government agencies, and firms that are
not publicly traded. The information security incidents
collected based on the above steps were all
confidential.

3.2. Independent variable
We used the standard eigenvector centrality
measure [3, 4, 12] from the network analysis to capture
board busyness for each firm in our sample.
Specifically, we used the measure to capture a network
of firms through multi-position directors—those who
hold positions on the boards of multiple firms. The
eigenvector centrality measure is a comprehensive
measure commonly used for a nondirectional network.
Our measure is different from the average number of
director positions held by all directors used in prior
studies [15, 16] because we believe this method more
appropriately captures how busy the board is both
directly and indirectly. To calculate this measure, we
gathered board information from the RiskMetrics
database from 2003 to 2011. We only collected data
up to 2011 due to data access limitations.
Our method assigns a score (eigenvector
centrality score) to all vertices (companies) in the
network mentioned earlier. A high eigenvector score
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means a vertex (a company) is connected to many
other companies who also achieve high scores through
multi-position directors. That is, the higher the value
is, the busier the board of a company is because multiposition directors exist and because other companies
wherein a director holds multiple positions also have
busy boards of directors. For our analyses, we
considered two centrality measures: one calculated
based on all a firm’s board directors (NET), and
another calculated based solely on a firm’s
independent directors (NET_INDE).

3.3. Control variables
We controlled the firm’s and board’s
characteristics that have been demonstrated as being
related to information security breaches in previous
studies. Firm characteristics were gathered from
Compustat, while board characteristics were collected
from RiskMetrics. We considered firm size,
performance, and growing opportunities for firm
characteristics; firm size (SIZE) refers to the number
of employees (in thousands). Previous studies [48]
argue that, although larger firms may possess more
effective control mechanisms regarding information
security management than smaller firms, they may
also be more likely to be targeted. We further control
for performance and growing opportunities, the
former of which was defined as return-on-assets
(ROA, net income of the firm divided by total assets)
and the latter of which was captured through the
market-to-book ratio (MB, market value of the firm
divided by the common stockholders’ equity). For
board characteristics, we considered board size
(N_DIR), percentage of independent directors
(P_INDE), the heterogeneity of directors’ ages
(SD_AGE), and the heterogeneity of directors’ tenures
(SD_TENURE). Board size, measured as the number
of directors on the board, has been considered to be
correlated with information security breaches because
the board may (1) monitor the effectiveness of the
firm’s information security management programs
[22] and/or (2) guide the development and
implementation of information security strategies
[22]. In addition, previous studies [10] have reported
that a nonlinear association may exist between board
size and the effectiveness of information security
management. Accordingly, in our analyses, we
additionally consider the square of the board’s number
of directors (N_DIRSQ). Independent directors are
involved in corporate governance mechanisms and
may ensure that information security risks are
appropriately accounted for, which would reduce the
possibility of information security incidents [14]. In
our analyses, we controlled for the percentage of

independent directors on the board. The heterogeneity
of the directors’ ages is measured by the age variation
coefficient, which equals the standard deviation of all
directors’ ages divided by the average age of all the
firm’s directors. The heterogeneity of the directors’
tenures is also measured by their variation coefficient
(i.e., the number of years directors have worked for the
firm), which equals the standard deviation of all
directors’ tenures divided by the average tenure of all
the firm’s directors. The heterogeneity of the
directors’ ages and tenures may potentially affect the
effectiveness of a firm’s risk management [47].
Finally, year and industry effects were also controlled.
We then merged the following three sets of data:
information security incidents, board connectedness,
and control variables. The resulting sample size is
11,642 firm-event observations; among these, 11,387
firm-event observations lack information security
events, while 255 firm-event observations possess
information security incidents. This rare event
characteristic is consistent with what previous studies
identified [48]. We then reperformed our analyses
using a matched sample in the section entitled
Additional Analyses.

3.4. Econometric model
We tested our hypotheses with Equation (1),
which was estimated using the logistic regression
model after controlling for industry- and year-fixed
effects with a firm’s clustered standard errors [35].
BREACH = β0 + β1Busyness + βjControl + ΣYear +
ΣIndustry + ε
(1)
Busyness represents either NET or NET_INDE,
while Control represents the control variables defined
earlier.

4. Empirical results
4.1. Main findings
The year and industry breakdowns show that
more reported information security incidents in recent
years and more incidents for industries with one-digit
SIC codes “5” (wholesale and retail trade), “6”
(finance, insurance, and real estate), and “7”
(services). The descriptive statistics of the variables
show that, on average, comprises nine board directors
(N_DIR) wherein approximately 75% are independent
directors (P_INDE). The firm size (SIZE), on average,
is approximately 19,000 employees. For firms with
and without reported information security incidents,
all variables are significantly different at a 1% level.
Specifically, firms without reported security incidents
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have a lower level of centrality (i.e., the directors are
less busy), fewer directors (N_DIR), fewer
independent directors (P_INDE), and are smaller in
size (SIZE). No large correlations that may affect our
analyses were observed.
The main results are provided in Table 1, wherein
four models based on Equation (1) reveal how our
results may vary with the inclusion or exclusion of
variables. Please note that the year- and industry-fixed
effects are included although not reported in Table 1,
and all significance levels are two-sided. Model (1)
only considers the association between board busyness
(NET) and the occurrence of information security
breaches (BREACH). The result demonstrates that
board busyness (NET) is positively associated with
BREACH (coefficient = 6.855, p < 0.01), suggesting
that, when the firm’s board is busier (i.e., when the
board member holds more positions), the likelihood of
information security incidents increases based on our
logistic regression model (Greene 2012).
Model (2), Model (3), and Model (4) consider
board busyness with board characteristics and, in
Model (4), additional control variables. The results
indicate that board busyness (NET) is significantly and
positively associated with the likelihood of
information security incidents (3.412, p < 0.01); that
is, when the board member is busier (i.e., she/he holds
more positions), the log-odds of having a breach
increase by approximately 3.412. Similarly, board
busyness as measured by independent directors
(NET_INDE) is also positively associated with the
possibility of information security breaches (2.728, p
< 0.01); that is, when the independent board members
are busier, the log-odds of having a breach increase by
approximately 2.728. Specifically, and as we
discussed earlier, information security risk is
idiosyncratic to individual firms [48]. To more
effectively manage information security risks, a
thorough understanding of IT resources, operations,
and the firm’s specific needs is required. From this
viewpoint, busy directors, although they may be
equipped with industry knowledge and possess a
broader understanding of emerging threats, may not
devote enough effort to a specific firm, which may
hinder the effectiveness of information security
management as captured by reported information
security incidents in our analyses. The findings
consistently demonstrate that larger firms (SIZE) are
more likely to experience reported information
security breaches. In addition, board size (N_DIR) is
positively associated with the possibility of
information security breaches (coefficients = 0.470
and 0.486, respectively, p < 0.05). Such findings
suggest that larger boards may be less effective in
communicating and coordinating, which subsequently

affects the effectiveness of information security
management. However, this is not a linear association
(the squared term, N_DIRSQ, is -0.019, p < 0.05); the
nonlinear association suggests that either a relatively
small or large board is more effective in managing
information security risks than is a medium-sized
board. We discuss our main results in the next section.
Table 1. Main Regression Results
Intercept
NET

Model
(1)
-3.667***
(-10.52)
6.855***
(12.61)

Model
(2)
-7.453***
(-6.46)
3.412***
(4.30)

Model
(3)
-7.501***
(-6.40)

Model
(4)
-7.105***
(-6.04)

3.418***
(4.00)
N_DIR
0.470**
0.540***
(2.51)
(2.63)
N_DIRSQ
-0.019**
-0.021**
(-2.19)
(-2.22)
P_INDE
0.293
-0.437
(0.39)
(-0.60)
SD_AGE
-0.049
-0.056
(-1.41)
(-1.50)
SD_TENURE
-0.040
-0.040
(-1.28)
(-1.39)
SIZE
0.010***
0.009***
(7.49)
(6.79)
ROA
-1.303
(-1.24)
MB
0.028
(0.93)
N
11,642
11,642
11,642
10,852
Pseudo R2
0.16
0.21
0.20
0.20
***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (two-tailed test), z statistics are in
parentheses and are estimated with firm clustered standard errors as
in Petersen (2009). All models include industry- and year-fixed
effects, although the results are not presented.
NET_INDE

2.728***
(2.76)
0.486**
(2.53)
-0.019**
(-2.09)
0.363
(0.47)
-0.059*
(-1.70)
-0.044
(-1.40)
0.010***
(7.95)

4.2. Additional analyses
In this subsection, we first consider whether board
busyness is related to reported information security
breaches with different sources of the incident (i.e.,
whether the reported information security incident is
caused by insiders or outsiders). Untabulated findings
demonstrate that, when the reported breach is caused
by insiders, the association between board busyness
(NET) is significantly larger than when it is caused by
outsiders (i.e., 3.345 vs. 2.893, χ2 = 106.93, p < 0.01),.
We also discuss this result in the following section.
We further investigate whether our results are
affected by governance or high-technology industries.
For governance, it is possible a firm with a stronger
governance environment is less likely to be affected by
board members’ busyness. To examine this
possibility, we gathered the governance score from
Bloomberg and reperformed our analyses. The
findings are consistent with our expectation.
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Regarding high-tech companies, information
security management is more inherent to their business
operations. For high-tech companies, a busy board
may have a smaller impact on information security
management than other industries. To reperform our
analyses, we employed Chemmanur, Loutskina, and
Tian [7] definition claiming high-tech industries are
the companies in the following three-digit SIC codes:
357, 366, 367, 372, 381, 382, and 384. Our results are
consistent with our expectations.
Additionally, we consider the following diverse
settings of our model to further validate our results.
First, busy boards may be endogenous. However,
choosing the appropriate instrumental variables is
challenging because (a) prior studies lack clear
guidance, (b) most firm characteristics are
theoretically related to both board business and
information security to some extent, and (c) many firm
characteristics have mixed associations with
information security breaches. Accordingly, we
choose total assets and industry membership as our
instrumental variables in the first stage. Specifically,
total assets and industry membership may be
indicators of a busy board, but they are not clear
indicators of information security breaches from a
theoretical perspective. In addition, total assets are not
highly correlated with existing size measures (number
of employees; correlation coefficient = 0.48). Given
that we cannot find strong instrumental variables for
the first stage from a theoretical perspective, we rely
on a statistical test for weak instruments. The firststage model is estimated by the ordinary least squares
model, while the second-stage model remains the
logistic regression model. In particular, the test first
demonstrates that we reject the weak instrument
hypothesis (χ2 = 27.32, p < 0.01). In addition, the
partial R2 and F-statistic equal 0.08 and 15.52 (p <
0.01), respectively, further suggesting the instrumental
variables are not weak. The main results remain
similar and thus further validate our main analysis.
Second, we consider performance and growing
opportunity as additional control variables, for which
our main results remain similar. Third, we also use
lagged independent variables in our model (i.e., breach
is at time t + 1, while independent variables are at time
t), and our main results remain similar. Fourth, our
results may also be affected by a potentially biased
sample; that is, firms with a reported security breach
may exist in specific industries and may be larger in
size. Therefore, we formed a control group using oneto-one propensity score matching with the nearest
neighbor algorithm. To achieve this, we first regressed
BREACH on SIZE, industry, and year using a logistic
regression model. From the model, the propensity
score (conditional probability of having information

security breaches) is calculated, the nearest neighbor
(control group with the smallest gap of propensity
compared to the event group) is identified, and the
resulting sample size becomes 491 observations. We
then reperformed our analyses and the main results are
similar.
In addition to quantitative analyses, we conducted
seven interviews—two with senior security
consultants who possess extensive experience in
information security governance, three with the listed
companies’ CIOs who reported to the board on IT and
cyber security issues, and two with the listed
companies’ board members—to gain insights
concerning the board’s role in information security
governance and the implication of board busyness.
Interviews with practitioners also serve as a method
for applicability checks [39, 44]. In the interviews, we
briefly described our work and asked interviewees
about both their thoughts on the research findings and
their personal experiences with or observations of
board busyness and information security governance.
We coded the interviews based on the role of board in
information security governance and in particular, the
implications of board busyness on the effectiveness of
information security management in organizations.
All our interviewees were consistent in their
viewpoints concerning the increasing importance of
board involvement in security governance, and one
CIO commented, “Continuous organizational
investment in technology, employee awareness,
training programs and IT professional skills is needed
for good organizational security. Without strong
support from the board, the security initiatives and
investment may suffer when competing with resources
with other business growth-driven initiatives.”
We also asked our interviewees about the
mechanisms through which the board gains familiarity
with the firm’s security practices. Most interviewees
considered engaging in conversations with security
experts or CIOs and having security risk management
progress reports on board meeting agendas as crucial
practices. Speaking from his own experiences working
with board members, one senior consultant stressed
that, if a board director is busy and misses a board
meeting, he or she will miss the opportunity to
“understand and ask the right questions about security
risks.” Interestingly, one CIO from a listed IT
company further suggested that the inclusion of cyber
security expertise on the board would be the fastest
way to educate other board members about
information security governance.
To enrich our quantitative findings on the impact of
independent directors, we also asked the interviewees
to comment on the role of independent directors. One
interviewee who serves as an independent director for
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a financial company and holds multiple board seats
claimed: “To understand IT security risk better,
independent directors need to be on both the audit and
risk management committees. I believe that the
frequency with which these directors attend the
meetings can be an important indicator of good
governance in organizations. Now, technology affects
every aspect of business operations. I would also
suggest that independent directors should have a
regular dialog with CIOs to understand the security
risks in the context of the business operation. I often
find these conversations very useful.”
In short, we consider that the above qualitative
findings extend the support for our argument on the
time and attention required for the board to acquire
security risk knowledge and to effectively perform the
information security monitoring function.

5. Discussion and conclusions
This study has examined the relationship between
board busyness and the effectiveness of information
security management in organizations. Our findings
have demonstrated that, when a board employs
directors who hold multiple board seats, the likelihood
of reported information security incidents is higher.
Furthermore, our results provide evidence of a
significant and positive correlation between
independent directors’ busyness and the possibility of
reported information security incidents.
We believe our research findings offer important
theoretical contributions to information security
strategy and governance research in modern
organizations. First, the focus on information security
management has been predominantly centered on
mechanisms that enforce user compliance and
awareness. Among these mechanisms, a number of
studies have pointed to the value of top management
involvement in and support of the implementation of
an information security program [21]. However, to the
best of our knowledge, a limited number of studies
have examined the relevance of the board of directors
in information security strategy and governance. Much
of the relevant work is available in practitioneroriented frameworks or guideline-related publications
[22]. In this research, we integrate the practical
viewpoints with a theoretical grounding from the
corporate governance literature. With this foundation,
we extend the notion of top management support to the
board level by discussing information security
governance. From the standpoint of risk oversight, we
draw on the board busyness concept and examine its
impact on the effectiveness of information security
management in organizations. Our findings help
reinforce the practitioner viewpoint by offering

evidence of the linkage between board busyness and
the likelihood of information security breaches. We
believe further quantitative or qualitative studies may
be conducted to analyze how interaction and
collaboration between the board and management
team might strengthen information security
governance and oversight. Another interesting study
might involve analyzing the impact of board support
on employee compliance, attitude, and behavioral
intention. Future research may also look into broad IT
competency and the effectiveness of information
security governance.
In addition, the practical implications of our
findings lend support to Nolan and McFarlan’s [33]
suggestion to establish an IT governance committee
work on the role of a board-level technology
committee. Our study provides practical guidance to
boards and management teams in several ways; for
example, Nolan and McFarlan [33] propose that a
company should “select appropriate members and the
chairman and determine the group’s relationship to the
audit committee” (p. 8). However, we believe the level
of board busyness is a unique contribution to the
consideration of board member selection based on this
proposal. Our work demonstrates that a busy board
member might not have the time and commitment
required to understand and evaluate the process of
information security planning and implementation.
Furthermore, as exemplified in our interviews with
practitioners, for effective information security
governance, board members must develop
organization-specific knowledge and analyze the
formal and regular reports from relevant functions. All
these endeavors require a greater amount of effort and
time. Therefore, other than a board member’s
technical knowledge, we recommend that, when
appointing an IT governance committee, attention
should be paid to the number of multiple board
appointments a director holds.
Second, our findings can bring research attention
to the corporate governance area. Studies in this area
have previously focused on the relation between board
busyness and organizational performance. Our
empirical results highlight that an evaluation of how
well the board performs its monitoring and oversight
function should not be narrowly confined to the scope
of its financial and operational performance. Given
advances in technology and regulatory compliance,
our study adds a new dimension to the discussion of a
board
governance’s
performance
and
risk
management role. We believe our exploratory findings
shed new light on how organizations understand and
assess the board’s value with a broader scope.
Furthermore, board member composition studies have
indicated the significance of independent directors in
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corporate governance and oversight. From the
perspective of agency cost, our empirical results offer
support to the argument that the independent director
is an important mechanism for ensuring organizations
have appropriate measures established to react to any
threats to corporate information or assets.
Third, our additional analysis offers another
interesting and important finding from the perspective
of insider and outsider attacks. Previous studies have
highlighted the importance of employees’ compliance
with information security policy, as noncompliance
can impose financial costs upon an organization [6].
Our literature review demonstrates that the extant
studies have focused on the antecedence or
effectiveness of factors that might instigate
employees’ compliance intentions and behaviors at the
employee level [31, 42]. In this research, we raise the
level at which this issue is examined by focusing on
the value of board oversight in reducing the likelihood
of an insider attack. We extend support to the
dominant view regarding the board of directors’
crucial role in shaping information security culture and
call attention to strengthening security governance at
the board level for internal security policy compliance.
However, some research limitations exist. First,
the completeness of security breach data and director
data is limited—a shortcoming we addressed by
conducting interviews with practitioners. Second,
similar to previous studies, our study is unable to
directly capture how a director with multiple positions
allocates his/her time and efforts. Future research may
employ qualitative case studies to enhance the
understanding in different contexts. Third, information
security breaches can differ in type and total losses.
However, our study is limited to incidents involving
confidential information. Fourth, our study is unable
to control for firms’ security policies and the
compliance issues, which may be an important
consideration for future studies. Fifth, decisions
regarding information security management involve
all related parties in an organization, which may be
investigated in future studies.
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